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INTRODUCTION 
Shareholder suits challenging mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
transactions remain common. Until 2016, they were filed in eighty-five to 
ninety-five percent of all deals over $100 million,1 and evidence suggests 
that any downturn since then may have been temporary.2 The pattern of 
these lawsuits is well documented: filings seek injunctive relief and settle 
(or, more recently, are mooted) by the defendants’ release of supplemental 
disclosures in the merger proxy, on account of which the plaintiffs’ 
lawyers are entitled to a fee based upon the corporate benefit doctrine.3 
 
*  T.J. Maloney Chair and Professor of Law, Fordham University School of 
Law. Thanks to Joel Fleming, Claire Hill, Kevin Miller, Anthony Rickey, Scott Rothstein, 
and Randall Thomas for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Thanks to Amith Arcot, Julian 
Constain, Vanessa Fazzino and Dmytro Usyk for excellent research assistance. All 
viewpoints and any errors expressed herein are mine alone. 
 1.  Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2015 
(Preliminary Figures) at 2 (Jan. 14, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2715890. 
 2.  Matthew D. Cain et al., Mootness Fees, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1777, 1794 (2019) 
[hereinafter Cain et al., Mootness Fees] (showing deal litigation back over eighty percent 
in 2017 and 2018 after a brief dip to seventy-four percent in 2016). Accord Securities Class 
Action Filings: 2018 Year in Review, CORNERSTONE RES. (2019), 
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Filings-2018-
Year-in-Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5M5-SZDV]. 
 3.  Sean J. Griffith, Innovation in Disclosure-Based Shareholder Suits, 69 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 927 (2019) [hereinafter Griffith, Innovation]; Sean J. Griffith & Anthony 
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These cases became the bread and butter of the “disclosure bar,” a sub-
class of plaintiffs’ lawyers that have built business models around 
regularly filing and swiftly resolving merger claims.4 
The Delaware Court of Chancery moved definitively against such 
suits in January 2016.5 In re Trulia Stockholder Litigation6 left no doubt 
that disclosure settlements would no longer be welcome in Delaware.7 In 
that case, the Court of Chancery held that “disclosure settlements” would 
be met with “disfavor in the future unless the supplemental disclosures 
address a plainly material misrepresentation or omission . . . .”8 
This Essay develops a unique dataset to examine the effect of Trulia 
on M&A litigation. Rather than examining patterns in merger litigation 
filed against public company deals, an empirical strategy followed by 
several important papers in this area,9 I examine the litigation patterns of 
repeat play shareholder plaintiffs. I develop an original hand-collected 
dataset of litigation filed by seven “frequent filer” shareholder plaintiffs 
over a five-year period, 2014 through 2018.10 During this period, these 
plaintiffs filed a total of 282 shareholder suits. In this Essay, I compile data 
on their claims, documenting the substantive allegations, procedural form, 
and the identity of counsel, as well as the outcomes of claims. I find that 
 
Rickey, Who Collects the Deal Tax, Where, and What Delaware Can Do About It, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON REPRESENTATIVE SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 140 (Sean Griffith 
et al. eds., 2018); Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder 
Litigation by Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2015) [hereinafter Griffith, 
Correcting Corporate Benefit]. 
 4.  Joel Edan Friedlander, How Rural/Metro Exposed the Systemic Problem of 
Disclosure Settlements, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 877, 882 (2016). 
 5.  There had been some prior warning. See, e.g., In re Riverbed Tech. Inc. 
Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 10484-VCG, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 241, at *21–22 (Del. Ch. 
Sept. 17, 2015) (“If it were not for the reasonable reliance of the parties on formerly settled 
practice in this Court, . . . the interests of the Class might merit rejection of a settlement 
encompassing a release that goes far beyond the claims asserted and the results achieved.”). 
I was a shareholder objector in Riverbed. 
6.  129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
 7.  Id. at 898. I filed a brief as amicus curiae in Trulia. See Brief of Sean J. 
Griffith as Amicus Curiae, In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 
2016) (No. 10020-CB). 
 8.  In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 898 (“In using the term ‘plainly material,’ I mean 
that it should not be a close call that the supplemental information is material as that term 
is defined under Delaware law.”). As we shall see, Trulia also established a favored 
“mootness path” to resolution. See infra Part II. 
 9.  Cain et al., supra note 2, at 1780 n.14, 1800–03 (discussing the empirical 
analysis in Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: 
An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557 (2015)). 
 10.  The phrase “frequent filer” has been used to refer to the lawyers that 
regularly bring nuisance litigation on behalf of shareholder plaintiffs. See In re Revlon, Inc. 
Shareholders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 943, 943 n.1 (Del. Ch. 2010) (coining the phrase 
“frequent filer” to refer to “repeat players who regularly bring representative actions on 
behalf of stockholders with small ownership stakes”). Here I use the phrase to refer to the 
shareholder plaintiffs themselves rather than the lawyers who file claims on their behalf. 
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over my sample period, frequent filer suits transformed from state court 
merger challenges based on fiduciary duty into federal court challenges to 
disclosure suits based on the federal securities laws. I also find that the 
outcomes of these suits transformed from class wide settlements based on 
supplemental disclosures (“disclosure settlements”) to mootness 
dismissals based on the defendants having corrected the alleged disclosure 
deficiencies (“mootness resolutions”).11 The common denominator 
between disclosure settlements and mootness resolutions is that both 
entitle plaintiffs’ counsel to collect fees from the corporation while the 
plaintiff class receives nothing but disclosures. 
I also argue that the evolutionary phases of this litigation are direct 
responses to legislative and judicial efforts to contain these suits. Claims 
moved from state to federal court to evade state law precedent that had 
become hostile to disclosure settlements. Once in federal court, these 
claims mutated again, transforming from disclosure settlements into 
mootness resolutions in order to avoid judicial scrutiny and the provisions 
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the PSLRA).12 
Furthermore, there is evidence of further evolution in these federal 
disclosure-based claims. Plaintiffs have now begun to file disclosure-
based claims against corporations in contexts other than M&A. And 
plaintiffs have begun to file as individuals rather than as a class, apparently 
as a further precaution against application of the PSLRA. 
I argue that the PSLRA, consistently applied, could address these 
problems. The PSLRA bars the award of attorneys’ fees for non-monetary 
recoveries.13 It also requires plaintiffs to meet a high standard of 
materiality at pleading, prevents plaintiffs from seeking to represent a class 
more than five times in three years, and requires a set of sworn 
undertakings by class action claimants.14 Consistent application of the 
PSLRA, however, requires judicial coordination which has so far been 
lacking among federal districting courts but which could be achieved 
through several mechanisms. Courts should use these mechanisms to 
coordinate their response to the problem of merger- and disclosure-related 
nuisance suits. Alternatively, repeat-play D&O insurers should incentivize 
their corporate insureds to resist disclosure-based shareholder suits. 
From this introduction, the Essay proceeds as follows. Part I describes 
the empirical methodology employed in this Essay. Part II reports the 
findings of my study, discussing filing and outcome characteristics and 
 
11.  See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Time Inc., No. 17-CV-09971, 2018 WL 4177938, at 
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2018) (“Sometimes these settlements are characterized as ‘mootness 
fees,’ in which the corporation moots the lawsuit by making the allegedly withheld 
disclosures, and pays plaintiffs' counsel a "voluntary" fee in return. . . . Such settlements 
principally benefit plaintiff's counsel.”) (internal citations omitted). 
12.  15 U.S.C. § 78u–4 (2018). 
13.  § 78u–4(a)(6). 
14.  § 78u–4(a)(2). 
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providing insights on the relationship between frequent filer plaintiffs and 
the disclosure bar. Part III interprets the findings, arguing that they are 
evidence of strategic pleading, first to avoid hostile state court precedent 
and, second, to avoid application of the PSLRA. Part IV offers 
recommendations on how courts can address the problems uncovered in 
this chapter. Finally, Part V summarizes and concludes. 
I. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
To collect data on the litigation patterns of frequent filer plaintiffs, I 
assembled a list of plaintiffs whose names I had frequently encountered in 
my own research or litigation activities.15 I then supplemented my list by 
surveying members of the Delaware bench and bar to identify the names 
of plaintiffs known to repeatedly file shareholder suits. This produced 
seven plaintiffs—Robert Berg, Stephen Bushansky, Natalie Gordon, Paul 
Parshall, Matthew Sciabacucci, John Solak, and Shiva Stein—each of 
whom has repeatedly been a named shareholder plaintiff in merger 
litigation.16 
Next, I searched court dockets for these plaintiffs’ names to assemble 
a set of cases in which they had been involved. I restricted my search to 
the five-year period spanning the Court of Chancery’s Trulia decision in 
January 2016. I searched from January 2014 through year-end 2018. I ran 
these searches in Bloomberg Law, an online service that collects docket 
information from all federal courts as well as prominent state courts, 
including the Delaware Court of Chancery. Within the Bloomberg Law 
 
 15.  I have filed objections to disclosure settlements. See, e.g., In re Riverbed, 
Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10484-VCG, 2015 WL 5458041, at *5 nn.16–17 (Del. Ch. 
Sept. 17, 2015); Vergiev v. Aguero, L-2276-15 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 6, 2016); 
Griffith v. Quality Distribution, Inc., No. 2D17-3160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 13, 2018); 
Stein v. Blankenfein, No. 2017-0354-SG, 2019 WL 2750100 (Del. Ch. July 1, 2019); In re 
PMFG, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 11223-VCS (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 2016); Bushansky v. 
Remy Int’l, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 3d 742, 750 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 16, 2017); In re Pharmacyclics, 
Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 2015-1-CV-278055, 2020 WL 780961 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. 
Ct. July 19, 2016). I have also provided expert testimony in merger litigation. See, e.g., 
Declaration of Sean J. Griffith in Support of Defendants FX Energy, Inc. and Kiwi 
Acquisition Corp’s Opposition to Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses, 
Richards v. FX Energy, Inc., No. A-15-726409-C (Dist. Ct., Clark County, Nev., June 17, 
2016); Corwin v. British Am. Tobacco, No. 14 CVS 8130, 2016 WL 635191 (N.C. Super. 
Ct. Feb. 17, 2016); Declaration of Sean J. Griffith in Support of Plaintiffs David D. Essig 
and City of Sunrise Police Officer’s Retirement Plan Opposition to Motion for Final 
Approval and Objection to the Proposed Settlement, In re Compuware S’holder Litig., 14-
011437-CB (Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne Cty. Sept. 29, 2015); Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns, 
Inc., No. 653084/13, 2014 WL 7250212 (NY Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 2014).  
 16.  I know nothing about these people other than the fact that their names 
regularly appear as named plaintiffs in shareholder litigation. I know nothing about their 
motives, nor am I certain that a single person has in fact filed all of the complaints listed 
under a single name. It is possible, if highly unlikely, that more than one person sharing 
the same name has filed some of these suits. 
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dockets database, I searched all federal and state trial court filings 
involving any of my seven named plaintiffs. I then sorted these results by 
hand, eliminating any suits that did not involve “shareholder litigation,” 
which I defined as litigation filed on the basis of the plaintiff’s status as a 
shareholder, principally including federal securities law claims and state 
fiduciary duty claims. After throwing out unrelated litigation and rejecting 
cases where critical docket information, such as the complaint, was 
missing and otherwise unattainable, I was left with a sample of 281 
shareholder suits filed by these plaintiffs over a five-year period. 
With regard to sample construction, some caveats are in order. First, 
the list of named plaintiffs for which I searched was informally obtained. 
I did not attempt to write a code that would identify all repeat shareholder 
plaintiffs who had filed claims in electronically searchable dockets, 
although such a search is at least theoretically possible. Instead, I relied on 
my own experience and the suggestions of those members of the Delaware 
bench and bar that were willing to respond to my queries. As a result, the 
sample is not comprehensive. There may be repeat shareholder plaintiffs 
whose filings I missed. And the sample may not be representative of the 
litigation activity of all repeat play plaintiffs. For example, there may be 
other repeat claimants who pursue predominantly meritorious claims, but 
if so, they are not the claimants studied here. Nevertheless, I do not claim 
that my sample is comprehensive or even, necessarily, representative. My 
only claim is that the litigation activity of these seven plaintiffs sheds light 
on how some repeat claimants have pursued merger litigation, both before 
and after Trulia. 
Second, the Bloomberg Law dockets database does not contain all 
merger litigation filed in the United States. For the 2014 through 2018 time 
period, Bloomberg Law offers comprehensive coverage of federal district 
court dockets and, critically, of the Delaware Court of Chancery docket. 
However, docket coverage in Bloomberg Law is less exhaustive for other 
state trial courts.17 As a result, filings in Delaware and in federal district 
courts may be over-represented in the sample, and filings in other state 
courts may be missing. However, Delaware’s predominance as the leading 
state of incorporation and the fact that shareholder suits can only be filed 
in three places—in the state of incorporation, the headquarters state, or 
federal district court—suggest that the predominance of Delaware and 
federal court filings is not entirely coincidental. 
 
 17.  For details on dockets covered in Bloomberg Law, see Product Help & 
Walkthrough: Docket Coverage – U.S. and International, BLOOMBERG L. (2020), 
https://help.bloomberglaw.com/docs/blh-040-dockets.html#breaking-complaints-
overview [https://perma.cc/SHG6-ZKFP]. 
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II. FINDINGS 
This Part presents data from my frequent filer dataset. Table 1 below 
summarizes the data by category. The subsections following the table 
discuss what the data reveal about lawsuit characteristics, outcomes, and 
the relationship between frequent filer plaintiffs and the disclosure bar. 
 
Table 1: Summary Data 
 Year 
2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 
Type of 
Filing 
Merger 43 97 24 25 24 
Derivative 3 4 4 8 2 
Proxy 13 15 8 0 0 
Traditional 
Securities 
0 0 0 4 1 
Other 1 2 1 1 1 
 
Forum Federal 52 112 23 12 5 
State 7 6 14 26 23 
 
Outcome Settlement 2 2 4 13 13 
Dismissal 51 106 25 9 5 
Motion 0 2 3 5 1 
 
A. Filing Characteristics 
Two features jump out of the lawsuit filings in the sample. First, the 
vast majority of filings (76%) are merger claims. Second, although the vast 
majority of these claims were initially filed in state courts, this trend 
shifted dramatically over the sample period. In 2014, 82% of these 
plaintiffs’ claims were brought in state courts. In 2015, the percentage of 
claims brought in state court fell to 68%, then in 2016, fell even more, to 
41%. By 2017 and 2018, the relationship had reversed entirely, with 96% 
and 87% of their claims being brought in federal rather than state court. 
These relationships are depicted in the figures below. 
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Figure 1: Lawsuit Filings by Type of Claim 
 
Figure 1 breaks plaintiff filings into types of claims. It categorizes 
claim types as merger suits, derivative suits, traditional securities class 
actions, proxy suits, and other. Merger suits include state law merger 
claims as well as federal court filings challenging merger proxy statements 
under Rule 14a-9, a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule 
applying to misstatements and omissions in the proxy materials of public 
companies.18 Because shareholders may bring class action claims to 
enforce Rule 14a-9, merger claims brought under it mirror the disclosure 
aspects of state law fiduciary duty claims. Moreover, like state merger 
claims, federal claims under Rule 14a-9 can be settled for supplemental 
disclosures. 
“Proxy suits” are defined to include claims alleging inadequate proxy 
statement disclosures under Rule 14a-9 that do not relate to M&A 
transactions. The proxy rules require detailed disclosure of a number of 
items, including the prior experience and compensation of directors and 
officers, details of fees paid to the company’s independent public 
accountants, and details concerning stock-based compensation plans. As a 
result, shareholders could bring claims alleging disclosure violations 
touching any subject on which shareholders are asked to vote. However, 
non-merger proxy suits arise most often in compensation-related 
disclosures. For example, Item 10(a) of Form S-K requires fairly detailed 
disclosure of stock incentive and other compensation plans, including the 
number of persons in each class of participants entitled to participate in 
the plan. Errors or omissions in such disclosures could thus give rise to 
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14a-9 complaints seeking to enjoin shareholder voting on the plan until 
corrective disclosure can be made. As Figure 1 shows, such claims have 
become an increasingly common claim pursued by the plaintiffs in my 
study.19 
The rest of the categories are fairly obvious. Derivative suits are 
fiduciary duty claims filed by individual shareholders seeking redress for 
a harm done to the corporation itself. Traditional securities class actions 
are claims filed under the sections of the federal securities laws that 
shareholder plaintiffs have historically used to seek relief—principally 
Rule 10b-5 promulgated under Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934. The plaintiffs in my sample filed only five traditional securities 
class action filings (three by Stein, one by Sciabacucchi, one by Solak), all 
of which allege claims under Rule 10b-5. Finally, Figure 1 includes a 
catch-all category for “other” shareholder suits, predominantly including 
books and records actions filed under Section 220 of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law. 
Figure 1 demonstrates that merger claims brought by frequent filer 
claimants did not disappear after Trulia. Moreover, the ratio by which 
merger suits predominate other shareholder claims increased slightly in 
the wake of Trulia. Prior to 2016, the sample contains roughly three 
merger suits for every other type of shareholder claim. After 2016, there 
are four times as many merger suits as there are other forms of shareholder 
suits. In 2016, the year in which Trulia was decided, there were only twice 
as many merger suits as there were other types of shareholder filings. 
Nevertheless, Figure 1 reveals that the type of suit that accounts for 
most non-merger litigation has changed in the wake of Trulia. Proxy suits 
challenging non-merger disclosures have largely taken the place of both 
derivative suits and traditional securities filings in the sample. These proxy 
suits were first filed in 2015 but have become increasingly common since 
Trulia. Moreover, they share a critical feature with most merger claims 
filed in the wake of Trulia: they are filed in federal court under Rule 14a-
9 of the federal proxy rules. 
 
 19.  Interestingly, however, all but one of the non-merger proxy claims in the 
sample were filed by a single litigant, Stein, with the sole remaining non-merger proxy 
claim brought by Bushansky. 
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Figure 2: Lawsuit Filings by Jurisdiction 
 
Figure 2 demonstrates what may be the most significant change in 
litigation activity in the wake of Trulia. The vast majority of shareholder 
suits in the sample are now filed in federal court. As the figure illustrates, 
this trend began in earnest in the year prior to Trulia, a time when 
Delaware courts began to suggest that they might soon act to restrain 
merger litigation. Having brought only two federal claims in 2014 and five 
in 2015, all but one of the frequent filers in my sample started filing federal 
claims aggressively in 2016.20 From 2016 through 2018, the remaining six 
frequent filers brought 148 federal securities lawsuits. This is consistent 
with other researchers’ findings. For example, a Cornerstone study shows 
that in 2015, the year before Trulia, thirty-four lawsuits were filed in 
federal courts relating to mergers; in 2017, the year after Trulia, there were 
198, and in 2018, there were 182.21 
Combining the insights of Figures 1 and 2 reveals that frequent filer 
plaintiffs are now bringing merger claims at an even greater rate than they 
brought them pre-Trulia. However, they are now bringing these claims in 
federal rather than state court, subject to Rule 14a-9 rather than state 
corporate law. Moreover, the next most common form of frequent filer suit 
from 2015 on, non-merger proxy claims, are also filed federal court cases 
under Rule 14a-9. In sum, frequent filer plaintiffs seem to have responded 
 
 20.  The exception is Gordon, most of whose claims were brought before 2016 
and all of which were brought under state law. See, e.g., Gordon v. Ford Motor Co., No. 
10269 (Del. Ch. Oct. 22, 2014); Gordon v. Pepco Holdings, Inc., No. 9612 (Del. Ch. May 
5, 2014); Gordon v. Bindra, No. 2:15-cv-01058 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2014). 
 21.  Securities Class Action Filings: 2018 Year in Review, supra note 2, at 14; 
see also Matthew D. Cain et al., The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, 71 VAND. L. REV. 












2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
State
Federal
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to Trulia by substituting Rule 14a-9 claims for state law merger claims 
and, having found their way into federal court under the proxy rules, by 
bringing additional proxy claims wherever they could find them. 
B. Outcome Characteristics 
Docket analysis also reveals a shift in outcomes. To analyze 
outcomes, I separated claims that had reached a conclusion into three 
categories: settlements, dismissals, and successful defendant motions. At 
the beginning of the sample period, settlements strongly predominated 
dismissals. In 2014 and 2015, for example, there were two times as many 
settlements as dismissals and over four times as many settlements as 
successful defendant motions. But this trend reversed sharply in 2016, as 
illustrated in Figure 3, below. 
 
Figure 3: Lawsuit Outcomes 
 
It is important to note that the dismissals captured in Figure 3 are not 
the result of a motion to dismiss or any other defense-side motion. Such 
dispositive motions are coded as “Motions.” Instead, these dismissals are 
some form of voluntary dismissal. Most often, these claims are dismissed 
because the defendant has taken some action that has the effect of 
“mooting” the plaintiffs’ claim, typically by making corrective disclosures 
to eliminate the alleged deficiencies of the proxy statement. As shown in 
Figure 3, mootness resolutions replaced disclosure settlements, more or 
less immediately after Trulia. 
From a tactical perspective, mootness resolutions have the benefit of 
clearing the way for plaintiffs’ attorneys to recover fees without the risk 
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disclosures in response to the compliant, the plaintiff’s attorney is entitled 
to recover fees from the defendant under the corporate benefit doctrine.22 
In theory, these fees can be contested by defendants and, if the plaintiff 
prevails in a hearing, ordered by the court. In practice, however, 
defendants often elect not to oppose fee requests. Figure 3 depicts the 
transformation of disclosure settlement into mootness resolutions. 
Why would defendants willingly pay plaintiffs’ fees without 
receiving the release of claims? Are not defendants who settle for 
mootness vulnerable to copycat claims filed by other shareholder plaintiffs 
challenging different aspects of disclosure? Again, the answer is in theory, 
yes; in practice, no. The corrective disclosures that moot shareholder 
claims typically issue very shortly before the shareholder vote. Once the 
shareholder vote occurs, the ability to receive a fee award in exchange for 
non-pecuniary relief disappears. Plaintiffs may still pursue damages 
claims, but in such cases the applicable legal standards are no longer 
favorable to plaintiffs. Both sides thus know that once the vote passes, the 
hold up value of the plaintiffs’ claim returns to near zero. As a result, 
mootness resolutions offer something for the lawyers on both sides. By 
waiting until shortly before the vote, defendants minimize the window 
available to other potential claimants and, in making the disclosures, 
effectively eliminate the potential for an injunction. At the same time, 
plaintiffs’ lawyers receive fees averaging $265,000 for claims that they 
need scarcely litigate.23 
C. Frequent Filer Plaintiffs and the Disclosure Bar 
Docket analysis also reveals patterns in the relationship between 
frequent filer plaintiffs and the law firms that bring their claims. Coding 
the law firms listed on frequent filer complaints reveals the recurrence of 
a core set of plaintiffs’ law firms. This is no surprise. Prior research on 
merger litigation has tended to focus on the law firms bringing the most 
complaints.24 Many of the same law firms appear in the frequent filer data 
as well—including, for example, Barrack Roddos, Faruqi & Faruqi, 
Pomerantz, Rigrodsky & Long, RM Law, WeissLaw, and Wolf 
Haldenstein. But starting with the plaintiff rather than the law firm allows 
 
 22.  Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit, supra note 3. 
 23.  Cain et al., Shifting Tides, supra note 21; Cain et al., Mootness Fees, supra 
note 2, at 1804.  
 24.  Adam B. Badawi & David H. Webber, Does the Quality of the Plaintiffs’ 
Law Firm Matter in Deal Litigation?, 41 J. CORP. L. 359 (2015); Friedlander, supra note 
4; Griffith & Rickey, supra note 3; C.N.V. Krishnan et al., Who Are the Top Law Firms? 
Assessing the Value of Plaintiffs’ Law Firms in Merger Litigation, 18 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
122 (2015); David H. Webber, Lead Plaintiffs and Lead Counsel in Deal Litigation, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 319, 328–31 (Claire A. Hill & Steven 
Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016). 
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the lawyer-client relationship to be examined from a different angle, 
shedding light on the relationship between the plaintiff and the law firm.25 
What does the data reveal about specific claimants and law firms? 
Four of the seven claimants in my study regularly file litigation with the 
same law firm. For example, RM Law was involved in twenty-five of 
thirty-one of Berg’s filings, WeissLaw was involved in forty-two out of 
forty-three of Bushansky’s filings, Faruqi & Faruqi was involved in all of 
Gordon’s filings, and Rigrodsky & Long was involved in fifty-seven out 
of fifty-nine of Parshall’s filings. These patterns may suggest that it is the 
lawyer, not the client, that is the interested party behind most of these 
filings. However, the pattern is also not inconsistent with an engaged 
plaintiff who has developed a relationship of trust and confidence with a 
particular lawyer or law firm. 
The remaining three claimants, however, reveal different filing 
patterns. For example, fourteen different firms brought Solak’s eighteen 
cases. Although many law firms recur in these filings—for example, 
Robbins & Arroyo was involved in six Solak cases, Wolf Haldenstein was 
involved in four, and Rigrodsky & Long was involved in three—it is 
difficult to discern a consistent pattern in the Solak cases. Likewise, 
although Rigrodsky & Long was involved in eleven of twenty-one of 
Sciabacucchi’s lawsuits, various other law firms were involved in the other 
ten. Similarly, Stein’s ninety-six suits were filed by thirty-eight different 
combinations of law firms. Three of these recur more frequently than the 
others—Wolf Haldenstein (forty-two), Barrack Rodos & Bacine (thirty-
eight), and Pomerantz (eighteen)—but it is difficult to discern a consistent 
relationship between the plaintiff and a single law firm. 
Cross-referencing law firm and claim type, however, reveals further 
patterns. As already noted, the vast majority of the claims in my sample 
are merger claims. The only other type of claim regularly filed by these 
plaintiffs in recent years are proxy suits—that is 14a-9 claims not related 
to M&A. There are thirty-six proxy suits in the sample, and as noted 
above, thirty-five of them were brought by Stein. Who were the lawyers? 
There is greater consistency in the law firms bringing Stein’s proxy 
suits than there is among the firms bringing her litigation as a whole. Of 
Stein’s thirty-five proxy suits, thirty-three of them were brought by either 
Wolf Haldenstein or Barrack Roddos & Racine. In two such cases, both 
firms were involved. In contrast, the remainder of Stein’s suits, including 
her forty-five merger suits, were brought by an assortment of firms, from 
which it is difficult to discern any pattern. This indicates specialization 
within the plaintiffs’ bar. These two firms bring claims that other law firms 
 
 25.  See generally Jessica Erickson, The New Professional Plaintiffs in 
Shareholder Litigation, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1089 (2013). 
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are not bringing.26 While it remains unclear whether the plaintiff chooses 
the lawyer or the lawyer chooses the plaintiff, it appears to be true that the 
type of case makes a difference in the choice. 
Finally, if we consider qualitative factors, it is possible to observe that 
although the vast majority of these lawsuits end in disclosure settlements 
and mootness resolutions, a small number of them were litigated seriously 
enough to result in significant pro-plaintiff judicial decisions. Three of 
these, both brought by Sciabacucchi, stand out. In the first, Sciabacucchi 
v. Liberty Broadband Corp.,27 plaintiffs produced a meaningful doctrinal 
development when they successfully argued that a shareholder vote could 
be coerced when it involves a choice made “in avoidance of a detriment 
created by the structure of the transaction . . . rather than a free choice to 
accept or reject the proposition voted on.”28 In the second, Sciabacucchi 
v. Salzberg,29 plaintiffs succeeded in arguing that forum selection 
provisions adopted by Delaware corporations are invalid to the extent that 
they require any claim under the Securities Act of 1933 to be filed only in 
federal court, a significant and controversial holding both limiting the 
scope of forum selection provisions and affirming concurrent state and 
federal jurisdiction over Securities Act claims. A third Sciabacucchi case, 
In re Tangoe,30 resulted in a judicial opinion holding the business 
judgment rule inapplicable to a merger in light of the inadequacy of 
corporate disclosures prior to the shareholder vote.31 Interestingly, these 
three cases were brought by a law firm that filed only five of 
Sciabacucchi’s twenty-two claims: Heyman Enerio.32 The other two 
Sciabacucchi claims brought by this firm resulted in significant monetary 
recoveries at settlement.33 
The Sciabacucchi cases brought by Heyman Enerio suggest further 
specialization. The Heyman Enerio firm was not listed on any other cases 
in the dataset, whether filed by Sciabacucchi or any of the six other 
 
 26.  The only proxy suit not involving Stein was brought by Bushansky and 
involved WeissLaw. Bushansky v. Carlucci, No. 1:17-cv-12091 (D. Mass. Jan. 24, 2019). 
 27.  No 11418-VCG, 2017 WL 2352152 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2017). 
 28.  Id. at *2. 
 29.  No. 2017-0931-JTL, 2018 WL 6719718 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 2018). 
30.   No. 2017-0650-JRS, 2018 WL 6074435 (Del. Ch. Nov. 20, 2018). 
 31.  Id. (holding Corwin “cleansing” inapplicable in light of inadequate 
disclosures). 
 32.  The firm changed names during the sample period, from Proctor Heyman 
Enerio LLP to Heyman Enerio Gattuso & Hirzel LLP. For the sake of brevity, I refer to the 
firm by the two names that persisted in each iteration: “Heyman Enerio.” Compare, e.g., 
In re Schawk Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 9510 (Del. Ch. Apr. 4, 2014), with Sciabacucci 
v. Malone, No. 11418 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 2015). 
 33.  In re Handy & Harman, Ltd. S’holders Litig., No. 2017-882-TMR (Del. Ch. 
July 10, 2019) (stating a preliminary settlement for $30 million); In re Pilgrim's Pride 
Corp. Deriv. Litig., No. 0058-JTL (Del. Ch. Jan. 24., 2018) (stating a preliminary 
settlement of $42.5 million). 
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plaintiffs, yet the firm succeeded in litigating or settling the five cases into 
which it was brought. This suggests that at least some frequent filer 
plaintiffs (or, alternatively, the law firms with the client relationship) 
differentiate between high value and low value claims, and for their high 
value claims, partner with law firms not otherwise associated with high-
volume, low-value litigation. 
III. IMPLICATIONS 
A basic implication from these findings is that plaintiffs and their 
lawyers are highly adaptive. The data demonstrates two significant shifts 
in frequent filer claims during the sample period: first, litigants shifted 
their claims from state to federal courts at the beginning of 2016. Second, 
around the same time, litigants began to shift from settlements to mootness 
resolutions. The first of these shifts likely reflects Trulia. The second may 
partially reflect federal receptivity to Trulia, but it likely also reflects the 
PSLRA. 
A. Evading Trulia 
As described above, Trulia left no doubt that disclosure settlements 
were no longer welcome in Delaware. Settlements would no longer be 
certified unless they presented “plainly material” disclosures.34 The 
disclosure bar’s choice was stark: adapt or die. 
The response to Trulia was immediate. Merger litigation quickly 
shifted to federal court under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act. 
In 2015, the year before Trulia, there were thirty-four total lawsuits filed 
in federal courts relating to mergers; in 2017, the year after Trulia, there 
were 198, and in 2018, there were 182.35 In the years since Trulia, federal 
courts have continued to experience high rates of merger-related filings, 
with the Third Circuit (which contains Delaware) experiencing the largest 
individual portion of this increased volume.36 
Initially, these plaintiffs presented settlements in federal court much 
as they had in state court prior to Trulia. But fairness hearings are required 
in class settlements, leaving them vulnerable to the risk that federal judges 
might refuse to approve settlements for what are effectively nuisance 
 
 34.  In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholders Litig., 129 A.3d. 884, 898 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
 35.  Securities Class Action Filings: 2018 Year in Review, supra note 2, at 14. 
 36.  Id. 
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suits.37 For example, in In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litigation,38 the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals referred to disclosure settlements as “no 
better than a racket” and expressly adopted Trulia’s “plainly material” 
language.39 
In response, the disclosure bar shifted tactics again, this time 
converting disclosure settlements to resolutions based on mootness. 
Mootness fees avoid judicial scrutiny when, as is often the case, 
defendants agree to the plaintiffs’ fee request. Because there is no class 
settlement and therefore no class-wide release of claims, there is no 
fairness hearing and, often, no further filing other than the notice of 
dismissal. Unsurprisingly, once federal judges began to express skepticism 
concerning disclosure settlements, plaintiffs shifted to mootness 
resolutions. This is now the most common form of merger claim: “In 2018, 
[ninety-two percent] of completed deal cases were brought in federal 
court. In that same year, in at least [sixty-three percent] of litigated cases, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys received a mootness fee.”40 
Mootness resolutions have tactical value to the disclosure bar not only 
because they avoid the judicial scrutiny otherwise associated with 
settlement. Mootness resolutions are also valuable to the disclosure bar in 
federal cases because they enable them to evade potential application of 
the PSLRA. 
B. Evading the PSLRA 
Congress enacted the PSLRA to contain the perceived spread of non-
meritorious securities class actions. Several provisions of the PSLRA are 
directly relevant to the 14a-9 claims into which most merger litigation has 
now evolved. First, the PSLRA expressly limits attorney’s fees to a 
fraction of damages recovered.41 Hence, if no damages are recovered, 
courts cannot award fees from the company. Second, the PSLRA requires 
plaintiffs to state with specificity why each alleged misstatement or 
omission is materially misleading.42 Third, the PSLRA requires plaintiffs 
 
 37.  See William B. Rubenstein, The Fariness Hearing: Adversarial and 
Regulatory Appraoches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1467–68 (2006) (explaining that because 
the release of claims provided in connection with class settlements affects the rights of 
absent class members, courts must approve the fairness of the settlement). 
38.  832 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 39.  Id. at 724–25. The Seventh Circuit has since doubled down on Walgreen, 
recognizing the “racket” of non-meritorious class action filings in contexts other than 
merger litigation. In re Subway Footlong Sandwich Litig., 869 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 
2017) (“A class action that ‘seeks only worthless benefits for the class’ and ‘yields [only] 
fees for class counsel’ is ‘no better than a racket’ and ‘should be dismissed out of hand.’”). 
 40.  Cain et al., Mootness Fees, supra note 2, at 1782.  
 41.  15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(6) (2018). 
 42.  § 78u–4(b)(1). 
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to identify, at the time of filing, other securities claims filed during the 
prior three years “in which the plaintiff has sought to serve as a 
representative party on behalf of a class.”43 Fourth, the PSLRA bars any 
plaintiff from leading more than five securities class actions in any three-
year period.44 Fifth, and finally, the PSLRA requires courts to make Rule 
11 findings with regard to any “complaint, responsive pleading, or 
dispositive motion” filed by plaintiffs’ attorneys.45 These provisions 
would seem to substantively impede the proliferation of merger-related 
nuisance claims in federal court. However, each of these requirements has 
a different trigger—some are triggered upon filing, some upon class 
certification, others upon final adjudication. This provides plaintiffs with 
an opportunity to avoid them through strategic pleading. 
First, with regard to the provision limiting attorneys’ fees to a fraction 
of damages, the PSLRA states that: “Total attorneys’ fees and expenses 
awarded by the court to counsel for the plaintiff class shall not exceed a 
reasonable percentage of the amount of any damages and prejudgment 
interest actually paid to the class.”46 Because no damages or prejudgment 
interest are paid to the class in a disclosure settlement or a mootness 
resolution, a straightforward reading of the plain text of this provision, 
uncontradicted by the legislative history, bars courts from awarding 
attorneys’ fees in such cases.47 Although some district courts have 
hesitated to accept this reading of the statutory text,48 others have adopted 
it.49 
 
 43.  § 78u–4(a)(2)(A)(v). The certification also requires the plaintiff to commit 
not to accept any payment in connection with the litigation other than her pro rata share of 
any recovery, except as approved by the court. § 78u–4(a)(2)(A)(vi). 
 44.  § 78u–4(a)(3)(B)(vi). 
 45.  § 78u–4(c)(1). 
 46.  § 78u–4(a)(6). 
 47.  An alternative interpretation—that Congress intended only to limit 
attorneys’ fees to a reasonable percentage of damages when damages are paid, not to ban 
fee awards for non-pecuniary relief—imports assumed meanings into otherwise 
unambiguous statutory text and is, in any event, unsupported by legislative history. Courts 
in other jurisdictions have read parallel statutes to bar non-pecuniary relief in class action 
settlements. See, e.g., Kazman v. Frontier Oil Corp., 398 S.W.3d 377, 387 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2013). 
 48.  See, e.g., Transcript of Settlement Conference at 48, Taxman v. Covidien 
PLC, No. 1-14-cv-12949-LTS (D. Mass. Oct. 2, 2015) (“[I]t is an awful lot of weight to 
read on that one sentence, that Congress rewrote the common benefit rule with respect to 
federal securities litigation in that sort of backhanded way, rather than directly. . . . I don't 
read the language quite as powerfully as you do.”). 
 49.  See Franchi v. Bay Bancorp, Inc., No. GLR-17-3699, 2018 WL 8415675, at 
*2 (D. Md. Oct. 25, 2018) (holding that because the plaintiff’s complaint was filed under 
the Exchange Act and was mooted by defendant’s supplemental disclosures, resulting in 
“no monetary benefit [to plaintiff] or the putative class. . . . [plaintiff] and the putative class 
are not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.”); see also Mostaed v. Crawford, Nos. 3:11-
cv-00079-JAG, 3:11-cv-00082-JAG, 2012 WL 3947978, at *7 (E.D. Va. Sept. 10, 2012) 
(“[P]laintiffs must be denied attorneys’ fees because the [PSLRA] amended the [Exchange 
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On its face, this provision applies only to fees “awarded by the court.” 
This applies most obviously to settlements. As discussed above, fees paid 
in most mootness resolutions are privately negotiated between plaintiffs 
and defense counsel.50 Hence, no court award. However, should a 
defendant contest a fee request, the only way for plaintiffs’ counsel to be 
paid would be for the fee to be awarded by a court on the basis of the 
attorneys’ efforts on behalf of the class. In this case, the PSLRA would 
appear to apply. As a result, an attorney petitioning for fees based upon 
her efforts in a class-based claim is asking for something the PSLRA bars 
the court from awarding.51 
Nevertheless, a route around the PSRLA’s ban on fees for non-
monetary relief remains. This provision, like many provisions of the 
PSLRA, depends upon the existence of a class. The provision applies to 
fees awarded “to counsel for the plaintiff class.”52 Whether settled or 
resolved for mootness, when claims are filed as class actions and assert a 
right to recovery on that basis, any fee award derives from the existence 
of a class claim and should therefore be covered under the PSLRA. But 
individual claims—that is, claims filed by a plaintiff in her individual 
capacity not claiming to represent a class—would seem to evade this 
provision. Indeed, the provisions of the PSLRA are generally applicable 
to “each private action arising under [the federal securities laws] . . . 
brought as a plaintiff class action pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.”53 By negative inference, it is not applicable to individual 
actions. 
Perhaps following this logic, a pattern of filing 14a-9 claims as 
individual rather than class actions has begun to emerge in my frequent 
filer data. The first individual (rather than class or derivative) complaint 
filed by a plaintiff in my dataset appeared in 2015, with the number of 
such claims steadily increasing each year: seven in 2016, fourteen in 2017, 
and twenty-two in 2018. Apart from being filed as individual complaints, 
with no reference to a class, these complaints are otherwise 
indistinguishable from class action claims. The only meaningful 
difference is that as non-class filings, they are not subject to the PSLRA. 
Other provisions of the PSLRA can also be evaded even more easily, 
either by filing as a class but never seeking certification, or instead, by 
 
Act] to prevent the award of attorneys’ fees except where counsel’s efforts have led to 
monetary relief that is ‘actually paid to the class’ of claimants.”); In re Microstrategy, Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 172 F. Supp. 2d 778, 784–85 (E.D. Va. 2001) (holding that the PSLRA operates 
as a “limitation on the fees and expenses awarded by a court”). 
50.  See supra notes 40, 46–47 and accompanying text. 
 51.  Franchi, 2018 WL 8415675, at *2. See also Mostaed, 2012 WL 3947978, at 
*7 (holding “federal law clearly precludes” attorneys’ fees when plaintiffs have not 
received a monetary judgment). 
52.  15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(6) (2018). 
 53.  § 78u–4(a)(1). 
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filing individual actions. For example the provision requiring courts to 
make Rule 11 findings is triggered by “final adjudication of the action.”54 
In the case of mootness resolutions, therefore, Rule 11 findings are not 
required because courts do not treat voluntary dismissals, with or without 
prejudice, as “final adjudication.”55 Likewise, the PSLRA’s presumptive 
prohibition against leading more than five class actions in a three-year 
period may only apply at class certification, when lead plaintiffs are 
actually appointing. Nevertheless, there is at least an argument that a 
plaintiff seeks to lead a class action when she files a class complaint and 
that therefore the presumptive ban should be interpreted to apply at filing, 
not only at certification. 
The PSLRA’s pleading and certification requirements, however, are 
clearly applicable at the time of filing.56 Plaintiffs therefore cannot avoid 
the requirement that they plead with specificity by seeking a mootness 
resolution. Applied strictly, this requirement would force plaintiffs to 
articulate precisely why specific misstatements or omissions make the 
proxy materially misleading. Pleading with specificity means not merely 
claiming, as plaintiffs often do, that disclosure is good, and more is better. 
Rather, it means stating precisely why each claimed omission—such as 
non-GAAP financial measures left out of the summary of the fairness 
opinion—makes the proxy statement materially misleading. For example, 
a federal court recently abrogated a disclosure-based mootness resolution 
on the basis of the materiality of the disclosures alleged in the complaint.57 
Holding that the proper inquiry was the materiality of the alleged 
disclosure deficiencies, not the corrective disclosures made by defendant 
subsequent to the filing of the complaint, the court found that none of the 
alleged disclosures met the standard of materiality and should therefore 
have been “dismissed out of hand.”58 
Likewise, the PSLRA’s certification requirement applies at filing, 
irrespective of class certification.59 Pursuant to this requirement, plaintiffs 
must certify that they are “willing to serve as a representative party on 
behalf of a class” and disclose the number of actions “in which the plaintiff 
has sought to serve as a representative party on behalf of a class” in the 
 
 54.  § 78u–4(c)(1). 
 55.  Rosenfeld v. Time Inc., No. 17-CV-09971, 2018 WL 4177938, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2018); Blaser v. Bessemer Trust Co., N.A., No. 01cv11599 (DLC), 
2002 WL 31359015, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2002); Unite Here v. Cintas Corp., 500 F. 
Supp. 2d. 332, 336–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also Manchester Mgmt. Co. v. Echo 
Therapeutics, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 451, 465–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (collecting cases). 
56.  §§ 78u–4(a)(2)(A), (c)(1)–(3)(A). 
 57.  House v. Akorn, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 3d 616 (N.D. Ill. 2019). 
 58.  Id. at 619. 
 59.  § 78u–4(a)(2)(A) (applicable to “[e]ach plaintiff seeking to serve as a 
representative party on behalf of a class”).  
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last three years.60 Because a plaintiff seeks to represent a class every time 
she files a class action, mootness claims filed as class actions therefore 
cannot evade the certification requirement. 
The plaintiff’s filing of the undertakings required in the certification 
creates an opening for further judicial inquiry into the adequacy of the 
plaintiff and her counsel. For example, if a plaintiff disclosed that she had 
filed multiple representative actions during that period, the court could ask 
additional questions, such as: 
• What results were obtained by the plaintiff in her 
representative actions filed over the past three years? 
• Has plaintiff’s counsel filed other representative actions on 
behalf of other plaintiffs over the same period? If so, what 
were the results obtained in these actions? 
Such questions would reveal whether the plaintiff was a frequent filer 
and unmask her counsel as a member of the disclosure bar. The court may 
also inquire into the relationship between the named plaintiff and 
plaintiff’s counsel. Are there financial or familial relationships that 
suggest the named plaintiff may be an inadequate monitor of class 
counsel? Federal courts have authority to inquire into these matters under 
Rule 23(a)(4), which requires the court to determine whether “the 
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class.”61 If the court is troubled by what it finds, it might inquire further: 
• Is the plaintiff willing to provide the putative class with 
notice and an opportunity to object to any resolution of the 
claim? 
• Would the parties consent to the judicial appointment of an 
amicus to evaluate the materiality of the allegations in the 
complaint, with such costs to be taxed to the parties? 
The point here is that courts can and should use the certification 
requirement as an opening to seek further undertakings and commitments 
from the parties in order to safeguard the interests of the putative class. 
However, like the bar on attorneys’ fees for non-pecuniary relief, the 
certification and pleading requirements can be avoided by filing 
individual, rather than class actions. The PSLRA applies to litigation in 
which a plaintiff has either been certified as a class representative or files 
a claim seeking class certification.62 Individual actions are neither of those 
things. It would therefore seem that plaintiffs can avoid the PSLRA by 
filing individual actions and resolving them for mootness. How the law 
should respond to these tactics is the subject of the next section. 
 
 60.  § 78u–4(a)(2)(A)(iii)–(v). 
61.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
 
62.  § 78u–4(a). 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The PSLRA ought to stop the flood of merger-related nuisance 
litigation into federal court and reverse the flow back into state courts. Not 
only does the PSLRA bar the award of attorneys’ fees for non-monetary 
recoveries, it also requires plaintiffs to meet a high standard of materiality 
at pleading, prevents plaintiffs from seeking to represent a class more than 
five times in three years, and requires sworn undertakings by class action 
claimants.63 Recognizing their inability to recover fees in federal court, 
plaintiffs’ lawyers would move their cases back to state court, where even 
if the salad days of disclosure settlements are over, courts remain receptive 
to awarding attorneys’ fees based on mootness resolutions.64 
Why, then, has this not happened? The obvious answer is that the 
PSLRA is not applied consistently. Indeed, that six plaintiffs brought 148 
securities lawsuits over a three-year period when the PSLRA would have 
limited them to a maximum of thirty suggests that the statute is often not 
applied at all.65 But why is that? 
This Part argues that three parties are to blame for the inconsistent 
application of the PSLRA: plaintiffs, defendants, and judges. First, 
plaintiffs thwart the PSLRA by pleading strategically. Second, defendants 
frustrate the PSLRA because they so frequently acquiesce to paying 
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees rather than contesting them. Third, judges have 
been unable (or unwilling) to coalesce around a single interpretation of the 
PSLRA and a coherent approach to mootness resolutions. In the sections 
below, I sketch these problems and offer solutions to each, noting the 
obstacles that remain. 
A. Prevent Strategic Pleading by Plaintiffs 
Plaintiffs plead strategically to avoid application of the PSLRA. By 
aiming for mootness resolutions rather than disclosure settlements, they 
are able to avoid class certification and “final adjudication.” Furthermore, 
 
63.  § 78u–4(a)(2); see also Sean J. Griffith, Class Action Nuisance Suits: 
Evidence from Frequent Filer Shareholder Plaintiffs 4 (European Corp. Governance 
Institute, Working Paper No. 502, 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3470330. 
 64.  Indeed, Trulia suggested that mootness was the “preferred scenario” for 
resolving disclosure-based claims. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 897 
(Del. Ch. 2016). Moreover, subsequent decisions in Delaware have suggested a lower 
standard of materiality for awarding mootness fees as opposed to disclosure settlements. 
See In re Xoom Corp. Stockholder Litig., No. 11263-VCG, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 117, at 
*10 (Del. Ch. Aug. 4, 2016) (awarding a $50,000 mootness fee for “disclosure provid[ing] 
some benefit to stockholders, whether or not material”). Under the circumstances, plaintiffs 
seem to have stayed away given Delaware’s tendency to award mid five-figure fees rather 
than the low six-figure fees now common in federal court.  
 65.  See discussion of Figure 2 supra Part II.A. 
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by filing individual rather than class actions, they are able to avoid any 
risk that the PSLRA will be applied to them. Consistent with this account, 
I found that the plaintiffs in my sample increasingly filed 14a-9 claims as 
individual rather than class actions. Courts should respond to this trend by 
refusing to award attorneys’ fees to individual claimants based on the 
value of class-wide relief and instead award fees, if at all, only on the basis 
of the named plaintiff’s proportional share of the benefit. Awarding fees 
to individual claimants based on class-wide relief is unsupported by 
doctrine and inconsistent with fundamental norms of equity. 
Underlying both the common fund doctrine, under which courts 
award attorneys’ fees for monetary recoveries, and the corporate benefit 
doctrine, under which courts award fees for non-monetary recoveries, is a 
principle of fee-sharing.66 Under both doctrines, the attorney is awarded 
by the class of beneficiaries on the basis of the benefit they share. This is 
most apparent when the attorney’s fee is taken from the monetary recovery 
to be shared by the class. But the principle also operates in derivative suits 
and class actions when attorneys’ fees for non-monetary benefits are 
assessed against the corporation. In the derivative suit context, the 
corporation is the legal plaintiff and therefore the attorney’s client, thus 
justifying the assessment of fees against it. In the context of a certified 
class, assessing fees against the corporation is justified by the fact that, 
through certification of the class and appointment of lead counsel, the 
attorney is made the legal representative of all shareholders. Because the 
corporation is an asset of all shareholders, assessing fees against the 
corporation ensures that they are shared by the class of beneficiaries 
represented by the attorney. 
There is no equivalent basis for fee-sharing when the plaintiff files an 
individual suit rather than a class action. When plaintiffs’ lawyers bring 
individual actions, their client is the named plaintiff and no one else. Just 
as any monetary recovery from the suit would belong exclusively to the 
named plaintiff, not the corporation (as in a derivative suit) or all 
shareholders (as in a class action), the common fund doctrine does not 
apply, and attorneys’ fees must be recovered from the named plaintiff. 
Likewise, in the absence of a derivative suit or a certified class, there is no 
legal basis for fee-sharing. In an individual action, the attorney does not 
represent the corporation or all shareholders as a class. Assessing 
attorneys’ fees against the corporation in the context of an individual 
action therefore amounts to fee-shifting, not fee-sharing. Fee-shifting is 
not supported by either the common fund or corporate benefit doctrines.67 
A logically consistent approach to attorneys’ fees for individual 
actions would limit an attorney’s fees in such cases to her client’s 
proportional interest in the class-wide benefit. Outside of the context of 
 
 66.  Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit, supra note 3, at 37–41.  
 67.  See id. at 38–41. 
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derivative suits and certified class actions, courts should not award fees on 
the basis of class-wide benefits. Instead, the attorney should be awarded a 
sum based on the value the disclosure achieves for the specific named 
plaintiff. So, if, for example, a shareholder plaintiff has 0.0001% of the 
common stock of a company, the proportionality principle implies that the 
plaintiffs’ attorney should receive a fee no greater than 0.0001% of the 
value of the class-wide benefit. Thus, assuming the total aggregate value 
of a highly material supplemental disclosure is $500,000, a court should 
award plaintiffs’ counsel no more than $50 in fees. 
This does not mean that attorneys cannot be compensated for having 
achieved class-wide relief. It means only that if they wish to recover fees 
on that basis, then they must do so under one of the two recognized 
procedural methods for doing so. They must file either a derivative suit or 
a class action. The derivative suit is the traditional vehicle for obtaining 
equitable or injunctive relief—benefits such as the prevention of an 
unlawfully convened meeting or reversal of an ultra vires action—from a 
corporation, but such benefits may also be achieved through class actions. 
Indeed, the history of merger litigation pre-Trulia typically involved state 
fiduciary duty suits brought as class actions.68 
The distinction between class and derivative actions, on the one hand, 
and individual complaints, on the other, is not a procedural peccadillo. 
Both the class and derivative suit contain substantive mechanisms to 
prevent abuse. Foremost among these in the derivative suit context is the 
demand requirement, which prevents individual plaintiffs from bringing 
representative litigation to which the board of directors objects.69 The 
theory here is that shareholders already have representatives (the board), 
and unless these representatives harbor some conflict of interest, they are 
the ones to determine whether the lawsuit is in the interests of all 
shareholders. Likewise, certification provides important protections for 
class members. Class certification provides a mechanism for shareholders 
to object to the appointment of lead plaintiff and lead counsel. Class 
certification also creates mechanisms for class members to opt out of the 
representation or object to the outcome. Finally, securities class actions 
trigger the additional protections of the PSLRA reviewed above. 
Individual actions provide no such protections. When an individual 
action is resolved for mootness, there is no opportunity for other 
shareholders to object to either the benefit or to the fees. As non-parties to 
the dispute, they have no standing to intervene. Attributing benefits and 
taxing fees to them thus amounts to an imposition of outcome and a 
 
 68.  Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder 
Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 167, 181–82 
(2004). 
69.  TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW 
LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES THE SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 28–29 (2010). 
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shifting of fees without giving them any choice in the matter. Not only is 
this contrary to the procedural requirements of Rule 23, more 
fundamentally it is contrary to basic norms of equity to appoint a de facto 
shareholder representative in a process that denies shareholders the 
opportunity to question the appointment, to contest the adequacy of the 
representative, and to object to the value of the resulting relief. Treating 
individual actions as the equivalent of representative actions lets a single 
plaintiff speak for a corporation’s entire shareholder base when no one—
no court, no corporation, and no shareholder—has evaluated that 
shareholder’s adequacy as a representative or inquired into her 
motivations. 
Another way of seeing this is through the lens of litigation agency 
costs. Representative actions—class and derivative suits—contain 
mechanisms for ensuring that the agent (the attorney) remains accountable 
to the principal (the shareholders). Individual actions, because the attorney 
is assumed to be directly accountable to her client, do not. Allowing 
attorneys to recover representative fees for filing individual actions avoids 
these mechanisms and renders the lawyers wholly unaccountable to the 
broader interests attributed to them. It would not be surprising if such 
unconstrained agents represented no one but themselves. 
Courts should therefore refuse to award representative fees to 
attorneys that file individual actions. Awarding class-based attorneys’ fees 
to individual claimants is inconsistent with fundamental principles of 
fairness and unsupported by the theory underlying both the common fund 
and corporate benefit doctrines. If courts consistently refused to award 
representative fees for individual actions, plaintiffs could still file 
individual claims. And some large institutional investors probably would 
do so. But most individuals probably would not, simply because they are 
likely unwilling to pay their lawyers directly and their lawyers, unable to 
recover fees from the corporation, would likely be unwilling to take the 
case. Instead, the lawyers would channel such claims back into class or 
derivative suit filings—a salutary result since class and derivative claims, 
unlike individual suits, contain mechanisms for ensuring the 
accountability of the attorney-agent to the interests of the shareholder 
class. 
B. Motivate Defendants to Resist 
All of the above focuses on the judicial award of fees. However, as 
already noted, most merger suits today are not resolved with a judicial 
award of fees, but rather with the corporate defendant acquiescing to pay 
the plaintiffs’ attorneys based on mootness. How, then, does clarifying the 
basis on which fees may and may not be awarded by courts affect a system 
in which fees are not collected by judicial order? Even if courts could not 
award class-based fees for individual filings, claimants could still file 
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individual actions and resolve them for mootness fees without involving a 
court. Alternatively, plaintiffs might not even file a complaint at all, but 
simply send defendants a letter threatening to do so unless they moot their 
concerns and acquiesce to paying them a fee for their troubles. 
Considering their willingness to pay rather than fight, defendants appear 
to be complicit in this arrangement, which explains why the strongest 
arguments under the PSLRA are so rarely raised. How, then, does a reform 
focusing on the judicial award of fees respond to a world in which fees are 
often paid without ever being awarded by a court? 
The answer lies in the notion that all bargaining takes place in the 
shadow of the law.70 What parties agree to do privately depends upon what 
they may be ordered to do publicly. Applied here, this means that the 
amount that judges can reasonably be expected to award in a contested fee 
application sets a ceiling on plaintiffs’ ability to claim fees from the 
defendant. As a result, plaintiffs’ inability to recover fees in court should 
reduce or even eliminate defendants’ willingness to pay them in private 
negotiations. 
In addition to the legal merits, a second contributing factor to 
settlement value is the cost of deciding a claim. If the process for 
determining a claim’s value is long and costly, it may have positive 
settlement value without regard to its underlying legal merit. Thus, even if 
plaintiffs’ attorneys are not entitled to a judicial award of fees, they may 
nevertheless be able to extract fees from the defendant up to the cost of 
litigating the claim. 
A clear means of addressing these costs is for defendants to credibly 
commit not to pay plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees in nuisance suits. If 
defendants did not pay, plaintiffs would not bring claims for hold-up value. 
The situation has the structure of a collective action problem: all 
defendants would prefer that no defendants pay fees to hold-up plaintiffs, 
but individual defendants would generally prefer to pay fees to get out of 
their own claim. Defendants cannot coordinate. Therefore, defendants 
cannot credibly commit. 
There is, however, a repeat-play defendant behind the settlement of 
every claim: the D&O insurer.71 Insurers could insist that their corporate 
insureds refuse to pay mootness fees, either ex post by litigating cases to 
the motion to dismiss, or ex ante by adopting “no-pay” bylaws that 
 
 70.  See generally Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A 
Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982) (explaining that when 
courts encourage private bargaining between parties, bargaining occurs in the shadow of 
the law). 
 71.  See BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 69, at 2–3 (observing that virtually all 
public companies carry D&O insurance and examining how D&O insurers change 
corporate incentives in governance and litigation). 
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preclude them from paying attorneys’ fees in nuisance suits.72 Because 
insurers play the bank in shareholder litigation, funding the conduct of 
litigation and settlements under the terms of the D&O policy, they have 
strong incentives to eliminate waste from the system. Moreover, they 
could motivate defendants by providing incentives (for example, by 
offering to pay litigation expenses in excess of limits) to policyholders for 
litigating the motion to dismiss or adopt no-pay bylaws. Moreover, 
litigation would not be necessary in every case but likely only a handful 
of cases, since once the credible commitment mechanism was established, 
plaintiffs would likely no longer waste their own resources on non-
meritorious suits. 
C. Coordinate the Judicial Response 
In a prior co-authored article, I argued that the problem of merger-
related nuisance suits would be solved by moving this litigation into 
federal court.73 My co-authors and I reasoned, consistent with the 
arguments above, that such claims would not survive an encounter with 
the PSLRA.74 Since the publication of that article, however, Trulia solved 
the problem in Delaware, yet merger-related nuisance litigation continues, 
largely unabated, in federal court. 
Our mistake lay in failing to account for differences in the 
organizational structure of the Delaware judiciary, on the one hand, and 
the federal judiciary, on the other. These differences give Delaware an 
advantage over the federal courts in responding to perceived litigation 
excesses. Most notably, in Delaware, a single court, the Court of 
Chancery, hears all corporate law cases, and although the judges on that 
court sit individually, the court has only seven (then five) members. 
Moreover, because the members of the Court of Chancery hear so many 
related cases and regularly meet to discuss them, it is relatively easy for 
the court to design a coherent and consistent approach to recurring issues 
or, as in the case of disclosure-based merger litigation, systemic problems. 
The federal judiciary, by contrast, consists of approximately 650 
district court judges scattered across the country.75 They do not specialize 
in a particular type of case. Moreover, in spite of the relatively large 
number of 14a-9 claims filed in federal district courts, individual judges 
 
 72.  Sean J. Griffith, Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No-Pay Provisions Can 
Fix the Deal Tax and Forum Selection Provisions Can’t, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN 
CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING UP? 292, 304–307 (Steven Davidoff Solomon & 
Randall Stuart Thomas eds., 2019) (explaining how no-pay bylaws could solve the 
nuisance suit problem). 
 73.  Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger 
Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557 (2015). 
74.  Id. at 608–12. 
75.  KAREN E. HAYDEN, SOCIETY AND LAW 89 (2020). 
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are not especially likely to be assigned one and may rarely encounter 
securities class actions during their entire career on the bench. Most 
federal judges do not have a background in corporate or securities law and 
are therefore unlikely to be familiar with the operation of the PSRLA or 
the policy issues surrounding it.76 They do not generally meet to 
coordinate their approach on issues and are not bound to follow other 
district court rulings even within the same circuit. Although district courts 
are bound to follow the rulings of their Circuit Court of Appeals, rulings 
in merger-related nuisance suits are rarely appealed. For this reason, 
binding appellate precedent is largely absent in this area—the notable 
exception being the Seventh Circuit77—leaving federal district courts 
largely uncoordinated and unconstrained. 
Additionally, federal judges are likely to be operating in an 
informational vacuum when the 14a-9 claims they have been assigned are 
resolved for mootness. Judges operating in an adversarial system, as 
opposed to an inquisitorial system, rely on the parties to inform them of 
relevant legal issues. However, unless the defendant contests the fee, there 
is no adversarial process before the judge in a mootness resolution. As a 
result, neither the requirements of the PSLRA, nor any other serious issue, 
such as the filing of individual as opposed to class actions, is raised to the 
judge. Only a highly motivated judge thoroughly steeped in corporate and 
securities law issues is likely to raise concerns sua sponte. Moreover, 
district court judges have a history of disregarding the PSLRA, even when 
the terms of the statute require them to act—for example, by requiring 
certified undertakings or making Rule 11 filings.78 When, as in the case of 
a mootness resolution, the parties have arranged for the discrete 
disappearance of their dispute, judges are unlikely to intervene to prevent 
the removal of a case from their docket. 
As a result, it is somewhat naïve to expect individual federal judges 
to solve the problem of merger-related nuisance suits.79 Were one federal 
district court judge to read the PSLRA and apply it as written, there would 
 
 76.  Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The 
Same Way Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud 
Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 85–86 (2002). 
 77.  See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 78.  Todd Henderson & William H.J. Hubbard, Judicial Noncompliance with 
Mandatory Procedural Rules Under the PSLRA, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. S87 (2015). 
 79.  My former co-authors have doubled down on this approach in a new paper, 
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federal district court judge. Cain et al., Mootness Fees, supra note 2, at 1805, 1810–14. 
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system that prevailed in disclosure settlements pre-Trulia. Marianna Wonder, The 
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consistent application of the PSLRA. 
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still be 649 or so that might not.80 In order for federal courts to solve the 
nuisance suit problem rather than exacerbating it, there must be a 
coordination mechanism around which federal district courts can organize 
a unified approach to 14a-9 filings and application of the PSLRA to them. 
Fortunately, coordination mechanisms exist. 
The Federal Judicial Conference (the “Conference”) consists of 
representatives from all levels of the federal judiciary and, through its 
standing and advisory committees, develops judicial policy for U.S. 
courts.81 The Conference could and should consider changes to procedural 
rules to develop a coherent and coordinated approach to merger- and 
disclosure-related litigation filed in federal courts. Specifically, the 
Conference should adopt a rule precluding judges from awarding 
attorneys’ fees based on class-wide benefits for filing individual actions. 
Fees based on class-wide benefits should only be available to attorneys 
filing class or derivative actions. Furthermore, the Conference could and 
should require federal district court judges to apply the provisions of the 
PSLRA to all securities class action filings. 
In addition to the Conference, the Federal Judicial Center (the 
“Center”) offers educational programming to federal judges on various 
substantive and procedural matters.82 The Center could and should design 
educational programming around the trends in merger-related nuisance 
suits described in this Essay. It should also design educational 
programming about the provisions of the PSLRA and their applicability to 
these suits. 
Coordination through the Conference and the Center would enable 
the federal judiciary to develop a unified approach to what has become a 
systemic problem. Merger- and disclosure-related claims filed under the 
federal securities laws and the mootness-based resolutions that accompany 
them are problematic not only because they impose a meaningless tax on 
corporations and their investors, but because the easy availability of fee-
based resolutions may disincentivize attorneys from investing in cases of 
legitimate wrongdoing. And taxing fees and costs to corporations without 
giving the shareholders an opportunity to opt-out or object is 
fundamentally inequitable and deprives them of statutory rights under 
Rule 23 and the provisions of the PSLRA. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay has examined the problem of merger-related nuisance 
suits. It has supplied empirical evidence from a dataset of frequent filer 
 
 80.  One is an exaggeration. There are at least three. See supra note 49 and 
accompanying text. 
 81.  28 U.S.C. § 331 (2018) (creating the Federal Judicial Conference). 
 82.  § 620 (creating the Federal Judicial Center). 
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plaintiffs, finding that over a five-year period seven individual plaintiffs 
filed 282 shareholder suits. Analysis of these filings reveals that they have 
been designed strategically to avoid hostile state court precedent as well 
as application of the PSRLA. The most recent innovation along these lines 
appears to be filing of individual rather than class-based complaints. 
Federal courts already have the means, through the PSLRA, to correct 
these problems. However, doing so requires coordination. Fortunately, 
coordination mechanisms exist. The Federal Judicial Conference and the 
Federal Judicial Center should be used to develop a unified approach to 
stop the flood of merger-related nuisance litigation. 
 
